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Abstract- The successful testing of the Kilopower reactor during 
the KRUSTY (Kilopower Reactor Using Stirling TechnologY) 
experiment significantly reduced the risk to fly fission power 
systems by demonstrating stable reactor operation through 
nominal and severe simulated mission scenarios. The 
experiment validated the neutronics, heat transfer, and power 
conversion systems needed for 1 kilowatt of electrical power 
production from the Kilopower reactor. The need for higher 
power reactors to support human exploration missions to the 
moon and Mars has become increasingly important due to the 
urgency to put boots on the moon by 2024 and have a sustainable 
presence in the following years. This desire has prompted NASA 
to continue the development of the Kilopower reactor to extend 
the power up to 10 kilowatts of electricity in support of a lunar 
base. These 10 kilowatt units are expected to be used as 
standalone units or be ganged together to create a modular 
power grid for propellent production, human habitats, and 
robotic exploration to name a few. The Kilopower reactor was 
originally designed to produce electrical power from 1 to 10 
kilowatts using the same highly enriched uranium fuel, sodium 
heat pipes, and Stirling convertors at the proper scale. 
Consideration has also been given to the use of low enriched 
uranium fuel for these missions and will be studied along with 
the other aspects of the reactor. This paper will focus on the 
design concepts and trades associated with the scale up of the 
Kilopower power conversion system and heat transfer system to 
support human exploration of the moon and Mars. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
NASA’s Kilopower project has successfully graduated from 
the Game Changing Development program to the 
Technology Demonstration Mission program, as a step 
forward to proving fission power technologies for lunar 
missions under space policy directive 1. Both programs are 
managed within the Space Technology Mission Directorate 
at NASA and are designed to mature technologies from early 
prototypes to flight hardware. The Kilopower Reactor Using 
Stirling TechnologY test (KRUSTY) performed in March of 
2018 at the Nevada National Security Site provided a short 
term nuclear demonstration of the 1 kWe Kilopower 
reactor[1,2]. This test provided valuable information into the 
readiness of highly enriched fast spectrum reactors for use in 
space and planetary power systems[3]. Successful 
demonstration of the technology has led to further 
developments of the Kilopower reactors including the scale 
up to 10 kWe for a lunar demonstration. A concept of the 10 
kWe reactor and power conversion module is shown in figure 
1 to provide some general knowledge of the system.  
Increasing the power output by a factor of 10 requires some 
architecture trades to allow for the additional heat to be 
extracted from the core to the power conversion system and 
rejected to the environment. These design architecture trades 
will include the number of heat pipes mated to the reactor 
core, the number and size of Stirling convertors, and whether 
a heat exchanger will be used in between the heat pipes and 
power convertors. To provide the correct solution requires 
several approaches that include failure modes and reliability 
of the system, the technology readiness of each component, 
assembly and qualification of the system, and manufacturing 
readiness and reliability for each component and subsystem 
to name a few. This paper will focus on the reliability of the 
system using several different architectures to see how the 
reliability of each component effects the system reliability, 
Beginning of Mission (BOM), and End of Mission (EOM) 
power output available to the user.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20200001569 2020-03-28T19:16:18+00:00Z
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Figure 1. 10 kWe Kilopower single convertor to heat pipe 
concept showing reactor core, shielding, and power 
conversion modules. Heat rejection system not shown. 
 
2. REACTOR CORE AND HEAT PIPE REDUNDANCY 
The 10 kWe (kilowatts electric) core requires approximately 
43 kWt (kilowatts thermal) to be generated by the reactor 
core. This thermal energy must then be transferred from the 
core to the power conversion system via the sodium heat 
pipes. The diameter, quantity, and arrangement of the heat 
pipes within the core effect the overall size and mass of the 
uranium core while providing redundancy against multiple 
heat pipe failures that can surpass fuel temperature limits. 
More heat pipes embedded within the core provides 
additional redundancy but displaces fuel which must be 
added to the outer diameter creating a significant mass 
penalty. Initial analysis has suggested that the balance 
between failure redundancy and core size requires 
approximately 24 heat pipes. Using 8 heat pipes on the inner 
part of the core and 16 around the outer part provides a 
symmetrical arrangement that can tolerate several failure 
modes of the heat pipes or down stream components such as 
a Stirling engine or heat rejection component.  
Core Thermal Analysis 
A conservative thermal analysis was completed to understand 
the worst-case scenarios that could impact the core’s material 
integrity by increasing the fuel temperature to 85% of its 
melting point (approximately 1000℃) through multiple heat 
pipe failure scenarios. The kilopower reactor design does not 
require the core to be a structural component in the system 
and therefore greatly reduces the impact of reduction of 
strength at high percentage of melt temperatures of the 
uranium molybdenum alloy.   
The worst-case failure is a heat pipe that loses its working 
fluid through a leak and has no ability to transfer heat away 
from the core. A failure of a downstream component such as 
a Stirling convertor or heat exchanger will generally have less 
impact given that the primary heat pipe will still be removing 
some heat from the core through insulation losses. All the 
failure modes in this analysis were assumed to be heat pipe 
loss of fluid failures of single and multiple neighboring units 
to be conservative.   
The model assumed perfect insulation of the outside surfaces 
with 43 kWt being generated evenly (no power peaking) 
within the fuel volume and evenly distributed among the 24 
heat pipes (-1.8 kWt per heat pipe). A convective heat flux 
boundary condition was set at the internal heat pipe boundary 
that would allow the neighboring heat pipes to absorb the 
failed heat pipe thermal load as temperatures increased. The 
remaining working heat pipes would continue to carry all of 
the generated 43 kWt for the analysis with no movement of 
the control rod. This methodology also requires the Stirling 
convertors to ramp up power production levels to match the 
additional effort required from each heat pipe.  
Figure 2 shows how the location of the heat pipe failure and 
combined effects of several neighboring heat pipe failures 
drive the maximum temperatures. Using 1000 ℃ at the 
maximum allowable temperature, several failure 
combinations could be overcome. In general, the inner heat 
pipes have more tolerance to neighboring failures and can 
survive 3 neighboring inner failures and one outer as shown 
in 4 HP Fail_3in_1 out in the bottom right corner of figure 2.   
The outer heat pipes could suffer at most two neighboring 
units with a maximum temperature of 971 ℃ as shown in 
case 2 HP Fail_Outer. Adding the third outer failure or two 
outer and one inner takes the maximum core temperature 
above 1000 ℃.  
This preliminary analysis provides some valuable 
information about how many heat pipes could fail assuming 
the remaining working heat pipes could passively adjust to 
the higher thermal loads with the Stirling convertors actively 
following. Realistically, if the core suffered that many 
unlikely neighboring heat pipe failures, the control rod would 
be moved to lower the core temperature and reduce overall 
power output. Additionally, the physics and passive control 
of the core using negative temperature feedback would self-
adjust the average core temperature back to 800℃ which 
hasn’t been taken into account for this analysis as seen with 
the rising core averages. The core reliability analysis will 
account for the probability of neighboring and non-
neighboring failures. A 24 heat pipe architecture that is 
permanently bonded to the uranium core will be used as the 
baseline for the remaining discussions to help narrow the 
focus of the power conversion system. 
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Figure 2. Thermal analysis of a 43 kWt Kilopower HEU 
core at 800 ℃ nominal average core temperature 
compared to several heat pipe failure scenarios and their 
corresponding temperature effects.  
 
3. HEAT PIPE AND POWER CONVERSION 
ARCHITECTURES 
We will graphically look at 3 different design options that 
help visualize the scale and arrangement of the Stirling power 
convertors and how redundant each system is. This 
information will lead into the reliability section where several 
designs are analyzed based on current knowledge of the 
probability of failure of each component. Additional 
components and subsystems are required for the heat 
rejection of the Stirling power convertors, but these will not 
be covered in this paper.  
Single Convertor to Heat Pipe Architecture 
The first system architecture is based on having a highly 
redundant number of strings by using one Stirling convertor 
for every sodium heat pipe. This configuration is shown in 
Figure 3 and requires 24 convertors rated at 500 We each with 
active or passive balancing. This design architecture was the 
baseline for the 1 kWe system used in the KRUSTY nuclear 
test and has several advantages.  
 
Figure 3. Single convertor to heat pipe concept showing 
(24) 500 We Stirling convertors with balancers and 
integrated sodium heat pipes 
The integrated heat pipe and convertor allow the hot end of 
the Stirling convertor to be welded into the heat pipe 
condenser providing superior heat transfer between the heat 
pipe vapor and the convertor’s heat acceptor. This provides a 
higher temperature hot end for the convertor which ultimately 
increases the efficiency and electrical power output of each 
convertor. This architecture also provides a modular system 
configuration in which each heat pipe and convertor can be 
fully tested before being assembled and bonded into the 
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reactor core. This modularity provides a lower risk approach 
to qualification and acceptance testing by allowing each 
individual unit to be tested independently and in conjunction 
with manufacturing production rates of both heat pipes and 
convertors.  Another added benefit of this design is the ability 
to easily determine independent heat pipe and convertor 
performance using minimum telemetry signals.  
The biggest disadvantage of this design is shown in table 2 
below which points out that the Stirling convertor and 
controller probability of failure have a direct impact on the 
localized core temperature excursions. This effect is reduced 
at the system reliability by keeping the power conversion 
string reliability high with 24 redundant strings.  
Secondary Heat Exchanger Architecture 
The second design architecture incorporates a heat exchanger 
that separates the primary heat pipes from the Stirling power 
convertors. This heat exchanger is shown in figure 4 as one 
sodium vapor chamber that is welded or brazed onto the 24 
heat pipes. In this arrangement the evaporator for the 
secondary heat exchanger is the outside diameter of the 
condenser section of the primary heat pipes. The hot ends of 
the 8 convertors arranged in a dual opposed configuration 
would also be welded into the vapor chamber allowing the 
sodium vapor to condense directly onto the pressure vessel at 
the heat acceptor location, similar to the integrated option in 
the first design case. This secondary vapor chamber is a 
separate pressure vessel from the 24 primary heat pipes and 
decouples any one Stirling convertor from effecting any 
single heat pipe.  
The main advantage of this arrangement is that it spreads the 
thermal effects of any Stirling convertor/controller failures 
over all 24 heat pipes. This effects the system reliability by 
not allowing the highest probability of failure component 
(presumed to be Stirling convertor/controller combination) to 
be directly tied to neighboring heat pipes. Another advantage 
of this architecture is that it allows fewer numbers of higher 
power convertors which may prove to be extensible to higher 
power systems.   
The major disadvantage of this system is the manufacturing 
complexity of the large welded system. The assembly will 
require a significant amount of time to process the primary 
and secondary heat pipe/vapor chamber and assemble all the 
Stirling convertors. Any one mistake during manufacturing 
or early test programs will result in major cost and schedule 
slips. Another obvious disadvantage is the single point failure 
of the secondary vapor chamber. A leak in the vapor chamber 
to the outside environment or a leak of the Stirling convertor 
working fluid into the sodium vapor chamber would result in 
total system failure. This would not damage the reactor core 
but the system would not be able to produce electrical power 
due to the inability of the convertors to receive appreciable 
heat. 
 
 
Figure 4. Welded secondary heat exchanger concept 
with (8) 1.5 kWe Stirling convertors arranged in a dual 
opposed configuration  
 
Radiatively Coupled Heat Exchangers 
The third design architecture offers a combination of 
modularity and redundancy using non-contact radiatively 
coupled heat exchangers. Figure 5 depicts the concept with 3 
separate secondary heat exchangers each carrying 4 Stirling 
convertors that slide over the primary heat pipes and transfer 
heat via a finned radative design. The male fins are bonded to 
the 24 primary heat pipes and coated with a highly emissive 
material. The female fin geometry is bonded to each heat 
exchanger with a high IR absorption material to effectively 
transfer the heat from the primary heat pipe to the secondary 
heat exchanger. In this architecture, the primary heat pipes 
can be fabricated, processed, and tested individually to allow 
easier component level qualification and acceptance testing.  
The same holds true for the secondary heat exchangers that 
are also sodium vapor chambers and can be assembled and 
verified through subsystem testing.  
The main benefit of this architecture is its modularity in 
assembly or disassembly as well as the ability to add more 
power or redundancy by adding additional heat exchangers. 
Another advantage is the ability of the primary heat pipes to 
thermally grow without being constrained to the secondary 
heat exchanger or Stirling convertors. This provides a 
simplified structural design for both the primary heat pipes 
and secondary heat exchanger and its attached convertors.  
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The drawback to this design architecture is the thermal 
performance hit taken across the radiatively coupled 
boundary and the additional engineering needed to 
successfully find the right materials for the finned parts. Early 
analysis has shown that a temperature delta of approximately 
100℃ is needed to transfer the required amount of heat 
within realistic surface area geometries. 
 
Figure 5. Radiatively coupled heat exchanger concept 
with (12) 1 kWe Stirling convertors.  
 
4. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS BACKGROUND 
Because of the near term lunar technology demonstration 
mission of the Kilopower 10 kWe reactor, an early decision 
is needed on the electrical power output from each Stirling 
convertor and the associated power conversion system 
architecture.  This is important so that design and 
development of the higher power convertor and controller 
can begin.  The rapid development timeline of a mid 2020’s 
lunar mission drives the power conversion design towards a 
highly redundant system. This mitigates overall power 
system risk and estimates individual Stirling convertor 
output.  In order to complete the reliability of the system, 
estimates are needed for each of its subcomponents.  Putting 
these subcomponents together in various architectures with 
various levels of redundancy improves the system 
reliability[4].  For this study, the subsystems that will be 
considered are the core heat pipes, the Stirling convertors, 
balancers for the convertors if they are not operated as dual-
opposed pairs, and the controller. Neither the reactor core nor 
the heat rejection system was included in this analysis.    
 
 
5. COMPONENT LEVEL RELIABILITY 
Core Heat Pipes 
 
The 10 kWe Kilopower core utilizes 24 sodium heat pipes to 
remove the heat from the reactor core. NASA has for many 
years developed sodium heat pipes for nuclear power 
systems.  Experience shows that these heat pipes have very 
long lives (>100, 000 hours) and, when destructively tested 
at the end of their lives, show no discernable change from 
when they were assembled.[5]   The core thermal analysis in 
the earlier section showed that three neighboring heat pipe 
failures  create temperature excursions above the prescribed 
limits. A range of assumed heat pipe reliabilities were 
considered to understand how their Probability Of Failure 
(POF) impacted the core POF.  Heat pipes, as well as 
thermosiphons, are expected to be extremely reliable 
components.   To bound the range of heat pipe POF, 0.1%, 
0.5%, 1% and 5.0% were considered.  A simplified core POF 
model was used to obtain approximate results of three heat 
pipes failing next to each other.  Table 1 shows the results of 
this analysis of core failures.  For the 5% heat pipe, the 
probability of three neighboring heat pipes failing in the core 
was 0.5673% with all others an order of magnitude below that 
value.  For the remainder of this analysis we will assume a 
1% POF for the each of core heat pipes.    
Table 1. Probability of Heat Pipes Failing in a 24 HP 
Core  
 
 
Intermediate Heat Exchanger 
 
In order to decouple the core reliability from the power 
conversion system, an intermediate heat exchanger is being 
considered.  Both sodium pool boiler concepts and radiative 
concepts have been discussed above.  Both are estimated to 
have a POF of 1% for this analysis.  This intermediate heat 
exchanger becomes increasingly important to overall system 
reliability if the reliability of the power conversion string is 
low.  Table 2 shows how the Stirling convertor, controller and 
balancer string reliability may impact the core reliability 
when the system architecture directly couples the power 
convertors to the core and does not use an intermediate heat 
exchanger.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heat Pipe 
Probability of 
Failure (%)
Heat Pipe 
Reliability (%)
Probability 
of No Heat 
Pipe Failures 
(%)
Probability 
of a Single 
Heat Pipe 
Failure (%)
Probability 
of Two Heat 
Pipe Failures 
(%)
Probability 
of 3 Heat 
Pipe 
Failures
Probability of 
Three Heat Pipe 
Failing Next to 
Each Other(%)
0.10% 99.90% 2.37% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.0000%
0.50% 99.50% 11.33% 0.64% 0.02% 0.00% 0.0001%
1.00% 99.00% 21.43% 2.39% 0.17% 0.01% 0.0017%
5.00% 95.00% 70.80% 33.92% 11.59% 2.98% 0.5673%
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Table 2. POF as a Function of Power Conversion String 
Reliability without Intermediate HX  
 
 
Stirling Convertors and Controllers 
 
Reliability estimates for Stirling convertors and controller are 
based upon work performed during the Advanced Stirling 
Radioisotope Generator program. Figure 6 shows the ASRG 
critical components and layout.  During this program, a 
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was 
performed for all of the components in the ASRG.  At the end 
of this process, estimated reliabilities for the various 
subcomponents and generator were developed.  Table 3 
shows the ASRG POF broken into sub-assemblies and 
included the Generator Housing Assembly (GHA), a pair of 
Advanced Stirling Convertors (ASC), and Advanced 
Controller Unit (ACU).   The overall reliability for the ASRG 
was estimated to be 96.9% for its 17 year life.  Each of the 
ASC’s had a POF of 0.84% with a combined POF of 1.76% 
and both are required to operate for a successful mission.  
Based on the layout of the generator, redundant convertors 
were not practical.    
 
The ASCs produced about 80 watts each for the radioisotope 
generator. Stirling convertors that will be used for the 10 kWe 
fission reactor will need to produce significantly more power.  
Higher power Stirling convertors will grow in length and 
diameter but their material selections, operation parameters 
and overall layout changes are relatively small. As an 
example, an 80 watt convertor optimizes for a frequency of 
operation at approximately 100 hz which is also true for a 1 
kWe convertor. The materials used for the hot end and cold 
end of the convertor are the same.  Internal structures, both 
gas bearings, flexures, and many other components are larger, 
but their designs are well understood and have been 
demonstrated.   In this analysis, we will therefore assume that 
the POF of a higher power but similar convertor design to the 
heritage convertors will result in similar POFs.    
 
For the ACU, a single card was required to operate each 
convertor and each card was estimated to have a POF of 
5.4%.   This POF dominated the other estimated subsystems 
by a factor of 3X.  Due to this relatively high POF, the 
decision for the dual opposed ASRG was to add a single 
backup controller card, giving the ACU 3 separate controller 
cards with 2 required for operation. While each card was 
estimated to have a POF of 5.4%, overall POF falls to 1.29% 
with the additional backup card. For Kilopower, system 
arrangements can use either a single card controller for a 
single Stirling or have a backup card (dual card controller)  
for a single Stirling, or have dual opposed Stirling convertors 
with a 3 card controller. A POF of 5.4% for each controller 
card will be the basis for the controller designs.  The POF of 
each arrangement is shown in Table 4.   
 
Stirling convertors require either a balancer or an opposed 
Stirling convertor to remove unbalanced forces from 
impacting the spacecraft. Active balancers use a mass and 
spring that are coupled to a linear motor and controlled by 
electronics that are very similar to the convertor controller. 
For this reason, a POF was developed using the similar 
components found in the ASRG FMECA.  Assembling a 
controller, motor, mass spring assembly, and housing 
assembly resulted in an estimated POF of 2%.  Passive 
balancers may also be used and would result in a considerably 
higher reliability, but the vibration force reduction is less than 
the active balancers.  2% POF will therefore be used as 
conservative representation of a balancer. 
 
Figure 6. Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator.  
 
 
Table 3. ASRG POF and Reliability Estimates.  
 
 
 
Table 4.  POF of Single and Dual Opposed Controllers.  
 
Stirling 
Convertor String 
POF (%)
Stirling 
Convertor 
String 
Reliability 
(%)
Core POF with Three 
Failed Stirlngs r(%)
1.00% 99.00% 0.0020%
10.00% 90.00% 4.00%
20.00% 80.00% 14.00%
ACU ASCs GHA 
System 
Probability of 
Failure 
Reliability 
1.29% 1.76% 0.07% 3.12% 96.89%
Description
POF with 
Single 
Stirling and 
One Card 
Controller
POF with  
Single Stirling 
and Controller 
with Backup 
Card
POF for Dual Opposed 
Stirling Convertors with 
2 Controllers and Single 
Backup Card
Number of Controller Cards 1 2 3
Minimum Required 1 1 2
Probability of Failure of Cards 5.40% 0.29% 0.84%
Common Cause 0.0045 0.0045
Overall POF 5.40% 0.74% 1.29%
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6. SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
Overall system reliability is based on the architecture and 
components one assumes.  The power conversion string POF 
for the systems considered are shown in Table 5.   The strings 
vary from 90.2% for the pool boiler/radiatively coupled 
designs to 96.4% for the 24 core heat pipes directly connected 
to a Stirling convertor with a dedicated balancer and dual card 
controller.   
 
 
  Table 5 POF for Several Power Conversion String 
Combinations  
 
 
 
  Figure 7 shows both power output and probability of 
providing full power as a function of the number of failed 
convertors for a 91.7% reliable string.  As an example, if we 
wish to have a 99.7% chance of producing full power at end 
of life, we would need to develop 686 watt convertors. Notice 
that (24) 686 watt convertors produce a total of 16,464 watts 
at the beginning of the mission. Subtracting the 6 string 
failures still produces 12,348 watts. After electrical losses 
from the controller and power management and distribution 
system, the electrical power available to the end user is 
around 10 kWe. As the string reliability goes up, the less 
redundant the system must be, thus reducing mass.  
 
Figure 8 shows the effects of adding a redundant controller to 
the 24 heat pipe to 24 convertor system, increasing the string 
reliability to 96.4%. The power level for the convertor has 
dropped to 617 watts to achieve a 99.9% reliability. The 
higher reliability string reduces the extra redundancy in both 
convertor power level and the number of failed strings. The 
system need only carry 4 redundant strings instead of 6 from 
the prior example. 
   
Figure 9 shows the effect of using a total of 12 convertors. 
This configuration requires the addition of an intermediate 
heat exchanger.  To provide a 99.8% chance of full power 
operation at the end of mission 1372 watt convertors are 
required. Finally, Figure 10 shows an 8 convertor 
configuration with the need for a 2058 watt convertor for an 
overall 99.5% reliability. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Reliability and single convertor power output  
of a 24 Stirling 91.7% (single card controller) reliable 
string as a function of the number of failed convertors. 
 
 
Figure 8. Reliability and single convertor power output  
of a 24 Stirling 96.4%(dual card controller) reliable string 
as a function of the number of failed convertors. 
 
Figure 9. Reliability and single convertor power output  
of a 12 Stirling 95.4% convertor/dual card controller 
power system as a function of the number of failed 
convertors. 
 
 
 
Case # core heat pipes # Stirlings
Intermediate 
HX
Stirling 
Convertor
Balancer + 
Controller
Stirling 
Controller Structure
String 
POF 
String 
Reliability 
 Core Heat Pipes to  
Stirlings, Balancers, Single 
Card Controller
24 24 None 0.83% 2.0% 5.40% 0.07% 8.3% 91.7%
 Core Heat Pipes to 
Stirlings, Balancers, Dual 
Card Controller
24 24 None 0.83% 2.0% 0.74% 0.07% 3.6% 96.4%
 Heat Pipes to HX, 
Secondary HP to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Single Card 
Controller
24 24,12,8 1.0% 0.83% 2.0% 5.90% 0.07% 9.8% 90.2%
Heat Pipes to HX, 
Secondary HP to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Dual Card 
Controller
24 24,12,8 1.0% 0.83% 2.0% 0.74% 0.07% 4.6% 95.4%
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Figure 10. Reliability and single convertor power output  
of an 8 Stirling 95.4% convertor/dual card controller 
power system as a function of the number of failed 
convertors. 
 
For the concepts which directly couple the core heat pipes to 
the Stirling convertors, the failure of any component in the 
power conversion string will feed back into the core.  The 
core reliability is therefore not just based upon the heat pipe 
failing but any of the components in that string.  Using the 
91.7% string reliability (Table 5) without a backup card raises 
the chance of failure of 3 neighbor heat pipe strings to 2.5% 
from the 0.0017% (Table 6) when the core is operated 
independently from the power system using the intermediate 
heat exchanger.  If we add a backup controller card to the 
string, string reliability improves significantly from 91.7% to 
96.4% and results in a core POF of 0.2%. This propagation 
of failures lead us to consider the radiative and pool boiler 
intermediate heat exchanger concepts discussed earlier. The 
consequence of adding the intermediate heat exchanger is 
that it defines the minimum POF which we set at 1%.  The 
benefit is that the downstream components, Stirling 
convertor, controller, and balancer combinations, allow us to 
vary the total number of convertors which may reduce the 
overall power system mass and cost.  
 
Table 7 shows a 12 convertor string architecture that can 
provide full power with 9 working convertors while  Table 8 
shows a 8 convertor string architecture that requires 6 
convertors operational to provide full power.  For the 24/18  
system with an intermediate heat exchanger little benefit is 
seen of adding the dual card controller because the POF of 
the power conversion system is so low.  For the 12/9 and 8/6 
systems  The POF has jumped from 0.26% to 2.4% and 
3.61% respectively.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Overall POF 24 Convertor Strings with 18 
Operating at End of Life 
 
 
 
Table 7 Overall POF 12 Convertor Strings with 9 
Operating at End of Life 
 
 
 
Table 8 Overall POF 8 Convertor Strings with 6 
Operating at End of Life 
 
 
 
 7. SUMMARY  
Kilopower is a promising new technology that will allow 
NASA to enhance its exploration of the Moon and Mars.   
This paper highlights some possible architectures of mating 
the Kilopower reactor with primary heat pipes, intermediate 
heat exchangers, and Stirling power convertors. Each 
architecture presents unique challenges for the Kilopower 
development team. Redundancy was explored as a way to 
increase system reliability and mitigate risk for the power 
conversion subsystem which is still very early in its 
development cycle. Although the POF and reliability 
numbers used in this report are early derivatives, the results 
show how the different architectures can all provide a highly 
reliable system using redundant units of lower reliable 
components. NASA and DOE will continue to study the 
many possible architectures while increasing the confidence 
levels of the reliability data. Equally important in the decision 
making will be the technology readiness of nuclear and non-
nuclear components and manufacturing methods, assembly 
test and launch operations, and the extensibility to future 
missions. 
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Case 
# core 
heat pipes
# Stirlings / 
#Opearting 
EOL
Core POF Intermediate HX
Power 
Conversion 
Subsystem
System POF System Reliability
 Core Heat Pipes to  
Stirlings, Balancers, Single 
Card Controller
24 24/18 2.5% 0.0% 0.26% 2.80% 97.20%
Core Heat Pipes to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Dual Card 
Controller
24 24/18 0.2% 0.0% 0.00% 0.20% 99.80%
  Heat Pipes to HX, 
Secondary HP to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Single Card 
Controller
24 24/18 0.0017% 1.0% 0.67% 1.67% 98.33%
Heat Pipes to HX, 
Secondary HP to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Dual Card 
Controller
24 24/18 0.0017% 1.0% 0.01% 1.01% 98.99%
Case 
# core 
heat pipes
# Stirlings / 
#Opearting 
EOL
Core POF Intermediate HX
Power 
Conversion 
Subsystem
System POF System Reliability
  Heat Pipes to HX, 
Secondary HP to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Single Card 
Controller
24 12/9 0.0017% 1.0% 2.40% 3.40% 96.60%
Heat Pipes to HX, 
Secondary HP to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Dual Card 
Controller
24 12/9 0.0017% 1.0% 0.17% 1.17% 98.83%
Case 
# core 
heat pipes
# Stirlings / 
#Opearting 
EOL
Core POF Intermediate HX
Power 
Conversion 
Subsystem
System POF System Reliability
  Heat Pipes to HX, 
Secondary HP to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Single Card 
Controller
24 8/6 0.0017% 1.0% 3.61% 4.62% 95.38%
Heat Pipes to HX, 
Secondary HP to Stirlings, 
Balancers, Dual Card 
Controller
24 8/6 0.0017% 1.0% 0.47% 1.47% 98.53%
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